[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
contained under that common [term] occurs on the part of the predicate that
it will be true, then (taking supposit in the sense in which a part of an ex-
treme can supposit) the common term does not supposit determinately. That
15 is, one cannot descend to singulars by a disjunctive [proposition] but only
by a proposition with a disjoint extreme or with a disjoint part of an ex-
treme. But now it is denoted by I promise you a horse , in virtue of the
verb promise , that I give you a horse or something like that will be true,
or that it ought to be true sometime. And it is not denoted that any
20 [proposition] like I give you this horse çø pointing to any horse whatever
çø will be or ought to be true. Therefore, it does not follow: I promise you
a horse; therefore, I promise you this horse or I promise you that horse.
The case is similar for such [propositions] as I owe you twenty pounds ,
He is indebted to Socrates to the extent of twenty marks .
25 (25) So then it is clear that I promise you a horse can be granted,
and yet A horse to you is promised should not in any way be granted lit-
erally. The reason for this is that in A horse to you is promised , horse is
the subject and not a part of the subject. Therefore, it has to supposit de-
terminately, since neither a sign255 nor a negation nor anything that includes
30 anything like that precedes [the term horse ]. Therefore, one has to be able
to descend to singulars. But in I promise you a horse , horse is not an ex-
treme but a part of an extreme. For the whole promising you a horse is the
predicate, because I promise you a horse and I am promising you a
horse are equivalent. So horse is a part of an extreme. Therefore, just as it
35 does not have to supposit, properly speaking, so [too] it does not have to
supposit determinately. Consequently, one does not have to be able to de-
scend to a disjunctive [proposition].
(26) But can one descend [at all] under a part of an extreme? It must
be said that sometimes one can descend. For example, it correctly follows:
255
That is, quantifier.
Copyright © 1995 by Paul Vincent Spade. This document may be copied and circulated
freely, provided only that this notice of copyright is included with all copies.
67
He gives Socrates a horse; therefore, he gives him this horse or he gives
him that one, and so on. But sometimes one cannot descend, on account of
some special reason like the one stated in the present case. And so, even
though I promise you a horse is granted, nevertheless A horse to you is
5 promised is not to be granted literally. Yet it is granted [anyway], because
it is generally taken for Someone promises you a horse . Now it will be
explained in the treatise on the proposition why the inference Someone
promises you a horse; therefore, a horse is promised to you is not valid.256
(27) To (d) the fourth [doubt], it must be said that in [propositions]
10 like He is deprived of sight , [the term] sight , which is part of an extreme,
does not properly supposit. Nevertheless, in the sense in which it can sup-
posit, it supposits confusedly and distributively. For [the proposition] is
equivalent to He has no sight , where sight is confused negatively con-
fusedly and distributively. But [the term sight ] does not supposit confus-
15 edly and distributively in every proposition expounding257 [ He is deprived
of sight ]. For [it does] not [supposit confusedly and distributively] in the
affirmative [exponent], namely, in He is by nature apt to have sight .
Rather, in this [affirmative exponent the term] supposits in a way determi-
nately, that is, [determinately] for [things258] that were sometime possible çø
20 although not for all of them, but [only] for those were able to inhere in him.
(28) To (e) the fifth [doubt], it must be said that literally Genera and
species are substances is false. But Genera and species are second sub-
stances can be granted. In that case, second substances supposits per-
sonally and determinately, because the name second substance is imposed
25 to signify second intentions that convey true substances.
(29) Therefore, the opinion is false that says that substance can
have simple supposition and yet supposit for species and genera. But if
sometimes you find in some author [the statement] that genera and species
are substances, [those] authoritative [statements] should be expounded259
30 either (i) [so] that a signate act is understood by an exercised act. Thus, by
Genera and species are substances there is understood Of genera and
species there is predicated substance . And [that act] should be exercised as
A man is a substance , An animal is a substance , and so on. Or (ii) the
authoritative [statement] should be expounded [so] that substance is
35 equivocal. For sometimes it signifies true things that are substances really
distinct from every real accident and from every second intention.
Substance is taken properly then. [But] sometimes it signifies the inten-
256
See Part II, Ch. 7. But this example does not occur there.
257
That is, contained in the analysis of.
258
In particular, for sights that is, for visual faculties.
259
See n. 257, above.
Copyright © 1995 by Paul Vincent Spade. This document may be copied and circulated
freely, provided only that this notice of copyright is included with all copies.
68
tions that convey substances in the first sense. And then, under that under-
standing, Genera and species are substances would be granted, taking the
predicate personally. But in that case [ substance ] would not be taken
properly, but rather improperly and transumptively.
5 (30) To (f) the sixth [doubt], it must be said that different [people]
use such abstract [terms] in different ways. For sometimes they use them
for things, [and] sometimes they use them for names. If [they are used] in
the first way, then it should be said that they supposit for [the things] for
which their [corresponding] concrete [forms] supposit, according to Aris-
10 totle s view.260 In that case, Fire is calefactive261 and Fire is calefaction
are equipollent, [and] likewise A man is a father and A man is paternity .
Indeed properly speaking such concrete and abstract [terms], if the abstract
[forms] are imposed to signify precisely things, are synonymous names ac-
cording to the view of Aristotle and of many philosophers.
15 (31) This is not so surprising, as can be convincingly shown. For I
take the proposition Creation is a true thing , and I ask: Does creation
supposit [there] for something or for nothing? If [it supposits] for nothing,
[then] either [ Creation is a true thing ] will not be a proposition or else it
will be a false proposition. If [ creation ] does supposit for something, [then
20 it supposits] either for an external thing, or for a thing in the soul, or for an
aggregate [of the two].262 If [it supposits] for an external thing, [then] I ask:
For which one? Only God can be given [as an answer]. Therefore,
creation supposits for God just as much as creating does. And this can
just as easily be said about every other [example].
25 (32) If [ creation ] supposits for something in the soul (for example,
according to some [people],263 it supposits for a relation of reason), that is
impossible, because in that case Creation is a true thing is impossible.
Likewise, there would never be creation except in the soul, and God would
not be creative except by means of an act of a soul that forms such a rela-
30 tion of reason. Similarly, it could just as easily be said that calefaction
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]